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ABSTRACT
Objective: In cognitive neuroscience, well-controlled and highly
specific paradigms have been developed to measure cognitive
processes over the last decades, often using computer-assisted
presentation and response registration. This approach is in con-
trast with the traditional paper-and-pencil tests used in clinical
neuropsychology, which typically assess cognitive function in a
less specific manner, often even at the level of a cognitive domain.
As a result, important aspects of cognitive (dys)function may be
missed during a neuropsychological assessment. This paper
focuses on the main challenges that need to be overcome in
order to successfully integrate experimental paradigms from cog-
nitive neuroscience into the clinical practice of neuropsychologists.
Method: Six challenges are discussed: (i) experimental paradigms
are often lengthy and may be overly specific; (ii) technical limita-
tions even today hamper their application in clinics; (iii) the psy-
chometric properties of methods used in cognitive neuroscience
are under-examined or poor; (iv) many paradigms from cognitive
neuroscience rely on reaction times rather than accuracy, limiting
their use in the many brain-injured patients with processing
speed deficits; (v) the predictive and ecological validity of these
paradigms often unclear; (vi) technological progress (e.g. Moore’s
law) seriously affects the continuous availability of experimental
computerized assessment methods.
Conclusion: Both cognitive neuroscientists and clinical neuropsy-
chologists should work together to develop and validate novel
paradigms for use in clinical assessments that are platform-inde-
pendent, reliable and valid, user friendly and easy to use in clin-
ical practice.
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Introduction
Neuropsychological assessment is aimed at characterizing individual differences in
cognitive function, with the eventual goal to estimate the probability that a given
performance is ‘impaired’, adjusted for confounding factors, such as age, gender,
socio-economic status and ethnicity. Such an assessment typically results in a cognitive
profile, in which strengths, weaknesses, and impairments in specific cognitive proc-
esses are identified which – for the sake of convenience – are usually grouped into
cognitive domains. These cognitive profiles can subsequently be used for medical
decision-making (e.g. from a diagnostic perspective), treatment identification or moni-
toring, and psychoeducation, taking into account the individual’s premorbid cognitive
status as well as specific information about the somatic status, brain disease or cere-
bral dysfunction. Neuropsychological assessment as a discipline that is part of clinical
neuropsychology has become an established field, with its own research – for
instance, on the psychometric characteristics of individual tests –, dedicated hand-
books (e.g. Neuropsychological Assessment by Lezak, Howieson, Bigler & Tranel, 2012)
and journals, specific clinical training programs aimed at assessment skills in settings
varying from child neuropsychology, forensic settings, memory clinics, rehabilitation
centers to general hospitals, and normative data sets for use individuals from all over
the world (see, for instance, Strauss, Sherman, & Spreen, 2006).
In order to make reliable and valid claim about someone’s cognitive profile, numer-
ous paper-and-pencil neuropsychological tests have been developed, each with its
own strengths and limitations, but when administered together, as part of an
‘assessment’1 are considered the gold standard for making such claims. These paper-
and-pencil tests are broadly available, sometimes even in the public domain. Extensive
normative data sets are available for most of these paper-and-pencil tests – although
their quantity and quality may vary – and their psychometric properties have often
been extensively studied (i.e. their validity and reliability; see e.g. Lezak et al., 2012).
These tests have not only been validated in large samples of healthy individuals from
ages that often cover the full lifespan, but also in clinical populations (notably patients
with specific neurological diseases, such as Alzheimer’s disease, stroke or traumatic
brain injury, psychiatric disorders, ranging from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder (ADHD) and autism to schizophrenia and obsessive-compulsive disorder, and
other somatic disorders that may or may not affect the brain directly, including human
immunodeficiency virus, cancer and diabetes). Many of these tests have become the
‘classics’ of neuropsychological assessment, i.e. tests that are available in many lan-
guages and are widely used.
Interestingly, these classic paper-and-pencil tests have been around for decades,
with some even over a hundred years old. For instance, the Digit Span paradigm was
first described by Jacobs (1887), the Trail Making Test (TMT) originates from the Army
Individual Test Battery published in the 1940s for use in the United States, Rey’s com-
plex figure was described in 1941 in Andre Rey’s paper on the assessment of traumatic
brain injury and the Stroop Color Word Test originates from experimental studies by
Stroop (1935). Many of these classic tests have also been made available as computer-
ized versions, typically mimicking the paper-and-pencil administration as much as
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possible, albeit that the keyboard, mouse or touch-sensitive screen is used for measur-
ing the responses (see e.g. Bauer, Iverson, Cernich, Binder, Ruff and Naugle, 2012).
Despite the fact that these classic paper-and-pencil tests are being widely used, this
approach has several important limitations, which hamper the valid interpretation of
the tests’ results. First, given that many of these tests are old, the principles on which
they are based are often outdated or may even have become obsolete. As a result,
many of these tests are not considered to be process-pure from modern day’s per-
spective. An example is the TMT, of which the first incarnation– The Taylor Number
Series – even predates the TMT version included in the Army Individual Test of
General Ability (Boake, 2002). It was developed as a performance test with the aim to
assess an individual’s intelligence, motor skills and alertness and later considered a
test to measure ‘organicity’ (see Eling, 2013, for a detailed description of its origins).
However, the TMT is a multifactorial test that is sensitive to deficits in working mem-
ory – and executive function in a broader sense, episodic memory, processing speed
and attention (see e.g. Oosterman, Vogels, Van Harten et al., 2010). This makes specific
claims about the underlying neurocognitive mechanisms of a poor performance on
this test complicated, although the test can still be a valid instrument for distinguish-
ing healthy individuals from brain-diseased patients. This lack of process-purity – also
seen in other tests or batteries, such as the Behavioral Assessment of the Dysexecutive
Syndrome (BADS), Rey’s complex figure or the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (see Lezak
et al., 2012) – calls for novel paradigms that will facilitate ‘precision neuropsychology’,
i.e. unraveling specific impairments in detailed cognitive processes rather than broad
cognitive domains (or even ‘cognition’ in general).
Paradigms in cognitive neuroscience
Cognitive neuroscience (CNS), a term coined by Michael S. Gazzaniga, is the research
field aimed at understanding ‘how the functions of the physical brain can yield the
thoughts and ideas of an intangible mind’ (Gazzaniga, Ivry & Mangun, 2009, p. 3). This
field has developed – and continues to develop – numerous paradigms that enable
the precise, fine-grained unraveling of cognitive processing, often from a translational
perspective, resulting in tasks that have an analogue for use in rodents, primates and
humans. Many of these paradigms have been used in studies focusing on the neural
underpinnings of the involved cognitive processes (for examples, using functional
magnetic resonance imaging or electroencephalography) and many of these tasks
have also been used in patient studies. Examples include Random Number Generation
paradigms to assess specific cognitive control processes (e.g. Maes, Eling, Reelick &
Kessels, 2011), N-back paradigms to study working memory updating in which the
cognitive load can be systematically varied (Kirchner, 1958), the Iowa Gambling Task
(IGT) to measure decision-making and risk taking (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, &
Damasio, 2005), Serial Reaction Time tasks for examining motor-sequence learning
(Nissen & Bullemer, 1987) or reversal learning paradigms for assessing adaptive behav-
ior (see Figure 1 for an example). The different outcome variables have often been
linked to highly specific neurocognitive processes, often embedded in specific theories
and models. Consequently, one could argue that it is these paradigms that could be
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the ideal candidates for substituting the classic, process-impure neuropsychological
tests discussed above. However, these often innovative paradigms are rarely used in
clinical practice. Why is it that they do not find their way to the clinic? Here, I will pre-
sent and discuss six challenges that must be overcome, which may guide test devel-
opment for use in clinical assessments.
Challenge 1: experimental paradigms are often lengthy and may be
overly specific
Consider the following case description:
Mr. Jones is 68 years of age, highly educated, and visits a neurologist because he
experienced multiple falls and has difficulty adjusting to new situations. He also
experiences mental fatigue. His wife also mentions everyday cognitive problems, such as
forgetfulness, difficulty acquiring new skills and planning difficulties. The neurologist
refers Mr. Jones to a clinical neuropsychologist for a full assessment. The clinical
neuropsychologist administers a combination of classic paper-and-pencil tasks and several
computer tasks that are based on evidence from cognitive neuroscience. (see Table 1)
The examples in this proposed test battery illustrate this challenge. That is, while
the paper-and-pencil tasks are short, with relatively few trials and only a few outcome
measures, the computerized paradigms are lengthy, involve many trials and result in
numerous outcome measures. Potentially, highly specific outcome measures enable a
clinical interpretation that is also highly precise (‘the patient has difficulty adjusting to
new situations, which may be related to the inability to maintain target information in
Figure 1. Example of a reversal learning paradigm that has been developed from a translational
perspective. Rodents, primates or humans have to detect partially or fully predictive outcomes of
stimuli and – once acquired – have to flexibly adapt to new stimulus-outcome contingencies.
Reprinted from Neuroscience, 345, A. Izquierdo, J.L. Brigman, A.K. Radke, P.H. Rudebeck, &
A. Holmes, The neural basis of reversal learning: An updated perspective, pp. 12–16, # 2017, with
permission from Elsevier.
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working memory across trials, while having intact visuospatial sketchpad processing’).
Such interpretation relies heavily on the expertise of the given clinical neuropsycholo-
gist though. Moreover, even if the task at hand has been validated and is reliable, its
outcome measures – notably specific indices such as difference scores contrasting two
conditions – may not always be. Furthermore, such a precise assessment may not
always be helpful in clinical practice, as conclusions are often presented at the level of
cognitive subdomains rather than based on highly specific cognitive processes that in
many disorders are also not selectively affected. Additionally, multiple outcome meas-
ures may even complicate the clinical interpretation, for instance, in the case of con-
flicting results, and the cost–benefit ratio of administering lengthy, overly precise
computerized tests can be debated, also considering that long test sessions hamper
the assessment’s validity due to mental fatigue and flaws in concentration because
of boredom.
Challenge 2: technical limitations hamper the use of computerized
experimental paradigms in clinical settings
Most paradigms used in CNS have been developed at universities or research insti-
tutes. That means that they have often been programmed using lab software such as
Presentation (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., Berkeley, CA, USA, www.neurobs.com) or
PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007). Software like this often requires full administrator rights of
the pc on which the software is running, which in clinical settings is rarely the case as
only ‘supported’ software is allowed to be installed and maintained. Additionally, the
use of desktop personal computers is increasingly phased out in clinics in favor of ser-
ver-based work stations, on which running such software is even more difficult. The
information technology (IT) infrastructure in clinics is also often lagging behind in
terms of operating systems, internet browsers or plug-in versions, which further com-
plicates the use of customized software. Moreover, the use of touch-sensitive screens
Table 1. Example of a test battery for Mr. Jones, consisting of both classic paper-and-pencil tests
(P&P) and paradigms originating from cognitive neuroscience (CNS).
Test Cognitive process P&P/CNS
Administration
duration No. of trials / items
No. of
outcome variables
Wechsler spa-
tial span
Working-mem-
ory updating
P&P 4min 20–25 2
Trail making test Cognitive flexibil-
ity/process-
ing speed
P&P 6min 3 3
Stroop color
word test
Response inhibition P&P 6min 3 3
Probabilistic rever-
sal learning
Adaptability CNS 45min 2 500 6
CANTABVR spatial
working
memory
Working-mem-
ory updating
CNS 8min 50þ 24
Serial reaction
time task
Implicit
motor learning
CNS 20min 6 100 6
Montreal cogni-
tive assessment
Overall ‘cognition’ P&P 10min 14 1
Brixton spatial
anticipation test
Rule detection P&P 7min 56 1
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or dedicated button boxes also requires specific hardware. While some of these limita-
tions can be overcome by the use of, for instance, stand-alone laptops dedicated for
test administration, data management can be complex as well. Most experimental
paradigms, for example, do not issue summary reports that can be used for clinical
interpretation, but raw output files at trial level. Data cannot be easily integrated with
electronic patient files and data safety cannot always be guaranteed if data have to
be physically moved using universal serial bus (USB) drives or sent via unsafe network
connections such as wireless local area networking (Wi-Fi), if these are available in the
first place. Finally, there is not one standard experimental software environment, but
many different software packages that need to be installed and maintained if one
wants to use different experimental tasks in the clinic. While these limitations may
seem trivial to those not working in clinical settings, it is factors like this that seriously
hamper the implementation of experimental computerized paradigms for neuro-
psychological assessment.
Challenge 3: psychometric properties of CNS paradigms are under-examined
or poor
Although many experimental paradigms have been used in numerous studies in the
field of CNS, these studies rarely deal with the psychometric properties of the para-
digms themselves but focus on the relation between the task’s outcome and, for
instance, neuroimaging correlates or differences between specific task manipulations.
However, in clinical neuropsychology, tests have to be reliable and show good validity
(Lezak et al., 2012). Unfortunately, even established experimental paradigms suffer
from psychometric shortcomings. For instance, reliability coefficients as low as .21
have been reported for the N-back paradigm (Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Perrig, & Meier,
2010), a widely-used task to study working memory processing. As a result Jaeggi
et al. (2010) conclude that the N-back paradigm should not be used for measuring
individuals differences in working memory performance, as an unreliable test by defin-
ition has poor validity. Concerning validity, several critical limitations have been identi-
fied by Buelow and Suhr (2009) concerning the IGT, a widely-studied decision-making
task examining risk-taking behavior. One such limitation is that performance on the
IGT appears to be highly dependent on the participant’s personality and mood state.
The authors conclude that ‘… these limitations may affect the IGT’s ability to be used
effectively as a clinical instrument to judge an individual’s performance’ (p. 111).
Another concern with CNS tasks is that they are paradigms rather than tests. That is,
a test typically consists of a standard set of stimuli in a fixed order, which has been
validated and examined in both normal participants and patient samples, administered
in accordance with strict guidelines and instructions. Most CNS paradigms lack this
standardization, as the number of trials differs across studies, the type of stimuli can
vary (verbal vs visuospatial) as well as the response mode (button-press, response box,
touch-sensitive screen). This makes implementation of especially novel paradigms diffi-
cult. For instance, in their review, Negut¸, Matu, Sava, and David (2016) concluded with
respect to virtual reality assessment in ADHD, while promising, only one task was
standardized in such a way that it could be used in neuropsychological assessment of
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attention deficits (i.e. the Advanced Virtual Reality Tool for the Assessment of
Attention [AULA]; Iriarte, Diaz-Orueta, Cueto, Irazustabarrena, Banterla, &
Climent, 2016).
Finally, even when experimental paradigms are available in a standardized format,
the lack of available norms may prohibit their use in clinical practice. For instance,
freely-available tasks such as the Working Memory Test Battery (containing multiple
working-memory paradigms; Stone & Towse, 2015) or the Box Task (a visuospatial
working memory paradigm; Kessels & Postma, in press) come with standardized stimu-
lus sets. However, in clinical neuropsychology, clinical decisions have to be made at
the N¼ 1 level, which means that confounding factors such as age, gender, socioeco-
nomic status and education level – which are known to affect the performance on
most if not all cognitive tasks – should be taken into account. Group means and
standard deviations reported in scientific papers rarely allow for these decisions, as
groups are small and often highly homogeneous (i.e. psychology undergraduates aged
18–21). Large normative samples of individuals who completed a fixed and standar-
dized version of a given task, in which the effects of the aforementioned confounding
variables can be studied and which can be used to transform an individual perform-
ance into a standardized outcome measure (e.g. percentile, T score) are required.
Challenge 4: CNS paradigms often rely on reaction times rather than accuracy
For measuring the effects of many experimental manipulations in CNS, reaction times
are more sensitive than accuracy. Many classic findings are even based on reaction
times only, as accuracy measures often produce near-ceiling effects. For instance, in
semantic priming experiments, semantically related words presented briefly prior to a
target word facilitate decisions about these target words in terms of reaction times
(i.e. making a word/non-word decision). In absolute terms, however, such effects can
be very small, as semantic priming effects of less than 20ms have been reported
(Bodner & Masson, 2003). Furthermore, the presentation duration of the primes (and
targets) in such experiments are also very short (e.g. less than 50-ms presentation dur-
ation for a prime stimulus; see Bodner and Masson, 2003).
Importantly, most of these established priming effects have been demonstrated in
undergraduate psychology students, but it is unclear whether these generalize to the
‘normal population’. That is, reaction-time variability in non-student participants can
be higher than the actual effect under study. Specifically effects of aging are import-
ant in this respect, as older adults may need 3 to 4 times more time to identify stimuli
after a mask than younger adults, resulting in large performance differences (Coyne,
1981). Furthermore, while undergraduate students who may regularly participate in
experiments are ‘trained’ in performing tasks in which reaction times are the outcome
measure and consequently respond as fast as possible, naïve and/or older participants
may adopt a different response strategy, for example, by favoring accuracy over speed
(Forstmann, Tittgemeyer, Wagemakers et al., 2011). Overall reduced processing speed
in older adults (Salthouse, 1996), a key target group in clinical neuropsychology, may
thus seriously lower the validity and complicate the interpretation of the performance
on either speeded stimulus presentation or reaction times as outcome measures.
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Challenge 5: unclear ecological validity
Most studies in CNS deal either with the cognitive or neural underpinnings of specific
task outcomes. Many of these paradigms have indeed been studied in a variety of
patient samples and have often been related to detailed lesion information, specific
brain dysfunction, or patterns of brain activation, providing evidence for the task’s
construct validity. Understanding the underlying neurocognitive mechanisms may also
be important in neuropsychological assessment. The extent to which a specific task
actually measures the cognitive function or domain under study (Is the lowered per-
formance on a memory task due to an executive control deficit or a mnemonic process-
ing impairment?) or is sensitive to specific types of brain injury (Is the task performance
related to prefrontal dysfunction or not?) determines the task’s ability to make a diag-
nostic prediction. However, in clinical practice it is often more important to establish
whether impairments may interfere with return to work or preclude living at home
independently, i.e. to make a functional prediction. The latter question is closely
related to the concept of ecological validity, specifically a task’s veridicality, i.e. the
extent in which a performance on a tasks predicts the performance on a criterion
related to everyday life. This type of predictive validity has been studied for many
traditional neuropsychological tests (e.g. Larson, Kirschner, Bode et al., 2005), but the
degree in which outcome measures of paradigms in CNS predict behavioral problems,
return to work, the course of decline or treatment response is largely unclear, even in
the case of experimental paradigms that have been studied in various
patient samples.
Another important aspect of ecological validity concerns verisimilitude. While not a
psychometric form of validity in the strict sense, verisimilitude is considered relevant
in neuropsychological assessment: do the tasks or tests resemble in any way everyday-
life challenges (Chaytor & Schmitter-Edgecombe, 2003)? Even established neuro-
psychological tests can be criticized in this respect, but tests have been developed
with the aim of resembling everyday-life task demands, such as the Rivermead
Behavioural Memory Test (Wilson, Greenfield, Clare et al., 2008) or the BADS. Tasks
that resemble everyday demands are often more appealing for patients, possibly
resulting in optimal motivation to perform as well as possible. In contrast, lengthy
computerized paradigms using abstract stimuli and requiring many trials can be per-
ceived as tedious an unmotivating, which may affect the performance validity.
Challenge 6: technical progress affects development and availability
Since many – if not all – cognitive paradigms used in modern-day CNS are adminis-
tered using computers, technological progress dictates the rate of development and
maintenance of computer software to be used. Computing power has been argued to
double every year since the 1970s (a phenomenon known as Moore’s Law), resulting
in continuous updates and upgrades of operating systems and hardware components.
There are, however, many examples of computerized test batteries that are being
used in the clinic – albeit more as trial outcome measures than as part of routine test-
ing – and some of these also include paradigms originating from CNS (e.g. CNS Vital
Signs, Cogstate, or the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery
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[CANTAB]; see Parsey & Schmitter-Edgecombe, 2013, for a review). Also, many widely-
used attention tests or batteries are successful examples of originally experimental
computerized paradigms that are being used in clinical practice (e.g. Conners’
Continuous Performance Test, Conners & Staff, 2015, or the Test of Attentional
Performance, Zimmermann & Fimm, 2002).
However, changes in software or hardware may also affect these tasks’ validity, as
variables like stimulus size and the accuracy of response time measurement may
change with every update. In theory, this would also require re-norming and re-vali-
dating of these tasks. However, the cost and time needed associated with such an
enterprise prohibit this in practice, especially in the case of open-source or public
domain software, which is not supported by a business model to earn back invest-
ments through revenues. Also, by the time a new computer version of test has been
fully validated and normed, it is likely that further updates have been deemed neces-
sary. This problem does not affect traditional paper-and-pencil tasks: the stimulus
words of the Hopkins Verbal Learning Test can be held constant for decades and the
stimulus sheet of the TMT has remained largely unaltered since its first use in neuro-
psychological practice.
Furthermore, more recent development with respect to cloud computing and the
use of tablets or even smart phones rather than desktop computers provide further
challenges. From the user perspective, data-safety and privacy rules and regulations
have already been discussed (see Challenge 2), but new developments like these are
also challenging for test developers. Tablets may on the one hand be useful tools for
facilitating computerized assessments, as they resemble the paper-and-pencil format
more than a computer-and-mouse setup (see e.g. Fellows, Dahmen, Cook, &
Schmitter-Edgecombe, 2017, on a tablet version of the TMT), on the other hand the
actual user interface differs greatly from actual paper-and-pencil administration.
Studies examining the equivalence of computer versions with the traditional paper-
and-pencil form or re-norming may thus be required.
Precision neuropsychology: the need for novel paradigms
Although it may be challenging to use novel paradigms developed and studied by
cognitive neuroscientists in clinical neuropsychology, classic paper-and-pencil tasks are
by no means always superior. Even the validity of widely used tasks such as the
Stroop Color-Word Test has been criticized (Eling, 2018), normative samples are some-
times small and important predictors such as education are not always taken into
account (e.g. for the BADS, see Strauss et al., 2006), and test-retest reliability can be
severely affected by practice effects, even when using parallel versions (e.g. for Rey’s
Verbal Learning Test; Van der Elst, Van Boxtel, Van Breukelen, Jolles, 2008). Clearly,
there is need for novel paradigms that are theory-driven on the one hand, but on the
other hand can be related to clinical outcomes.
Many existing paradigms from CNS could be adapted for use in clinical assess-
ments. Also, novel approaches such as the use of virtual reality, or ecological
momentary assessments (experience sampling), in which data are collected multiple
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times a day by the patient in their home environment (Parsey & Schmitter-
Edgecombe, 2013), using for example tablets or wearables, have the potential to
innovate neuropsychological assessments. Such innovations may facilitate measure-
ments and consequent interpretations that are not possible using classic paper-and-
pencil paradigms or computerized versions thereof. Cognitive neuroscientist need to
collaborate with clinical neuropsychologists though, in order to achieve this in such
a way that these tasks result in answers to clinically relevant questions. Moreover,
we should not necessarily shy away from the paper-and-pencil format of assessing
patients, as reliable experimental findings should be robust enough to be detected
by paper-and-pencil measures (e.g. the Stroop effect by timing the response with a
stopwatch, amnesia by measuring recall of pictures shown on cards or words read
aloud, and executive dysfunction by perseveration on tasks requiring task switching
or set shifting).
Overcoming the challenges: conclusion
The six challenges addressed in this paper need to be overcome by clinical neuropsy-
chologists in close collaboration with colleagues from the field of CNS. For CNS para-
digms to be used in clinical assessment, (1) paradigms should be reduced to the
essentials, focusing only on reliable and clinically meaningful outcome variables, (2)
tasks need to be platform independent, preferably using internet-based environments
that can run on any work station, pc or tablet, (3) more research (and funding) is
needed on the psychometric properties of experimental paradigms, (4) experimental
tasks should be adapted for use in the clinic in such a way that accuracy becomes
more important than reaction time, (5) computer tasks could be made more attractive
by gamification of paradigms, also enabling experience sampling, and everyday out-
come measures should be included in research on ecological validity, and (6) open-
access platforms should be made self-sustainable in order to facilitate the long-term
availability of tasks.
Note
1. Note that obviously, a neuropsychological assessment is not limited to administering tests
and interpreting their outcome in a quantitative way, but also involves a clinical interview
with the patient and his/her spouses, medical history taking, behavioral observation and
the interpretation of non-cognitive factors, such as personality, wellbeing and
psychological symptoms, which should all be integrated with the results of
neuropsychological tests.
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